To the top

Page Manager: Webmaster
Last update: 9/11/2012 3:13 PM

Tell a friend about this page
Print version

Trust and power as determ… - University of Gothenburg, Sweden Till startsida
To content Read more about how we use cookies on

Trust and power as determinants of tax compliance across 44 nations

Journal article
Authors Larissa Batrancea
Anca Nichita
Jerome Olsen
Christoph Kogler
Erich Kirchler
Erik Hoelzl
Avi Weiss
Benno Torgler
Jonas Fooken
Joanne Fuller
Markus Schaffner
Sheheryar Banuri
Medhat Hassanein
Gloria Alarcón-García
Ceyhan Aldemir
Oana Apostol
Diana Bank Weinberg
Ioan Batrancea
Alexis Belianin
Felipe de Jesús Bello Gómez
Marie Briguglio
Valerij Dermol
Elaine Doyle
Rebone Gcabo
Binglin Gong
Sara Ennya
Anthony Essel-Anderson
Jane Frecknall-Hughes
Ali Hasanain
Yoichi Hizen
Odilo Huber
Georgia Kaplanoglou
Janusz Kudła
Jérémy E. Lemoine
Supanika Leurcharusmee
Thorolfur Matthiasson
Sanjeev Mehta
Katarina Nordblom
Sejin Min
George Naufal
Mervi Niskanen
Engin Bağış Öztürk
Luis Pacheco
József Pántya
Vassilis Rapanos
Christine Roland-Lévy
Ana Maria Roux-Cesar
Aidin Salamzadeh
Lucia Savadori
Vidar Schei
Manoj Sharma
Barbara Summers
Komsan Suriya
Quoc Tran
Clara Villegas-Palacio
Martine Visser
Chun Xia
Sunghwan Yi
Sarunas Zukauskas
Published in Journal of Economic Psychology
Volume 74
ISSN 0167-4870
Publication year 2019
Published at Department of Economics
Language en
Keywords Trust, Power, Slippery slope framework, Tax compliance, Tax evasion
Subject categories Psychology, Economics


© 2019 The slippery slope framework of tax compliance emphasizes the importance of trust in authorities as a substantial determinant of tax compliance alongside traditional enforcement tools like audits and fines. Using data from an experimental scenario study in 44 nations from five continents (N = 14,509), we find that trust in authorities and power of authorities, as defined in the slippery slope framework, increase tax compliance intentions and mitigate intended tax evasion across societies that differ in economic, sociodemographic, political, and cultural backgrounds. We also show that trust and power foster compliance through different channels: trusted authorities (those perceived as benevolent and enhancing the common good) register the highest voluntary compliance, while powerful authorities (those perceived as effectively controlling evasion) register the highest enforced compliance. In contrast to some previous studies, the results suggest that trust and power are not fully complementary, as indicated by a negative interaction effect. Despite some between-country variations, trust and power are identified as important determinants of tax compliance across all nations. These findings have clear implications for authorities across the globe that need to choose best practices for tax collection.

Page Manager: Webmaster|Last update: 9/11/2012

The University of Gothenburg uses cookies to provide you with the best possible user experience. By continuing on this website, you approve of our use of cookies.  What are cookies?