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Why comply? Attitudes towards harvest regulations among Swedish fishers

Artikel i vetenskaplig tidskrift
Författare Sverker C. Jagers
Daniel Berlin
S. Jentoft
Publicerad i Marine Policy
Volym 36
Nummer/häfte 5
Sidor 969-976
ISSN 0308-597X
Publiceringsår 2012
Publicerad vid Statsvetenskapliga institutionen
Sidor 969-976
Språk en
Länkar dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2012.02...
Ämnesord Fisheries, IUU fishing, Fisheries management, Compliance, Trust, Co-management, norwegian fisheries, management, acceptability, legitimacy, deterrence, awareness
Ämneskategorier Ekonomi och näringsliv

Sammanfattning

Why do fishers break rules? And why do they follow them? The answers to these pertinent questions could contribute to reducing overfishing, stock decimation, environmental degradation, economic losses and community failures. This explorative paper presents findings from a nationwide survey among Swedish fishers, who were asked what, in their opinion, would justify non-compliance, why fisheries management regulations are not being respected, and what might help improve the situation. The survey was conducted to test four inducements often suggested in the literature: Fishers' compliance/non-compliance is based on (a) their own benefit, (b) whether they feel morally compelled to do one way or another, (c) whether compliance is believed to create a negative impression among peers and (d) whether they accept the justification given for introducing the rules. Among other things, the study finds that the moral motives of law-abidingness and peer group solidarity rank the highest among the reasons for compliance, that large-scale fishers are more concerned about deterrence than small- and medium-scale fishers and also that co-management experience makes fishers less inclined to accept non-compliance by fishers who seek to boost their income. (C) 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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