GLD och QoG anordnar ett lunchseminarium den 31 oktober med Peter Van der Windt, docent i statsvetenskap vid New York University – Abu Dhabi.
Title of talk/Presentation
Recruiting and Incentivizing Community Service Providers: Experimental Evidence from Sierra Leone
Abstract
Recruiting and incentivizing service providers is a central challenge for many low-income country governments. Research emphasizes the potential benefits of involving beneficiary communities. However, we do not know whether community monitoring is more or less effective than performance-based payment schemes or how these monitoring schemes depend upon personnel recruitment strategies. For example, state-led recruitment strategies may mitigate the effectiveness of community monitoring mechanisms, as locally embedded workers may be more responsive to community pressures. We collaborate with the Ministries of Health and Agriculture in Sierra Leone and implement a field experiment involving Community Animal Health Worker recruitment and incentives in 300 villages. We use a factorial design and randomly assign health workers to community monitoring and/or a pay-for-performance scheme. In addition, in a subset of villages, we also manipulate worker recruitment strategies, where workers are selected either by state authorities in collaboration with Paramount Chiefs or by communities themselves. We use behavioral measures to quantify the quality of worker performance.
Bio
Peter är docent i statsvetenskap vid New York University – Abu Dhabi. Han använder fältexperiment och undersökningar för att förstå frågor relaterade till styrning, förflyttning och tillhandahållande av tjänster i områden med en begränsad stat. Han fokuserar på Afrika söder om Sahara, särskilt Demokratiska republiken Kongo och Sierra Leone. Hans arbete har publicerats i bland annat Journal of Politics, Journal of Development Economics och Political Analysis. Peter tog sin doktorsexamen i statsvetenskap från Columbia University 2015.