GenDip and IP seminar with August Danielson

Abstract

The presumed inability of individuals to reflect on practices has been a distinguishing feature of the IR practice turn. However, this claim is seldom problematized: who is unable to reflect; and what is it that they are unable to reflect on? This article questions this assumption and argues that the role of reflection in IR practice research has been neglected because practice scholars often conflate two separate dimensions of practice: the logic of practice and the rules of a practice. The logic of practice can be understood as the structural component of a practice that predisposes individuals to act appropriately without them necessarily knowing why. The rules of a practice by contrast are knowable and often explicitly verbalized. The conflation of these two dimensions has led to incoherent epistemological assumptions regarding what researchers and practitioners can know about practices, as well as the effects of changes in practices. I argue that if practice scholars are to gain a better understanding of practices, we must first distinguish between these two dimensions. The utility of this distinction is illustrated through a critical review of four approaches to practice: Bourdieusian praxeology, the Communities of practice approach, Schatzki’s ontology of practice and pragmatic sociology.