Cooperative and non-cooperative collusion and strategic patenting
Short description
The focus for this project is research in the economic area of collusion and strategic use of intellectual assets using patents, and other intellectual property rights (IPRs). The emphasis will be on cooperative and non-cooperative collusion in static and dynamic oligopolistic structures.
Coordinated behavior often increases firms’ profits, as well as it can be used to prevent entry, achieve different corporate objectives, or enhance firms’ positions in the market . These incentives explain why firms have been practicing collusive practices for a long time and continue to do so . Collusion might lead to the formation of cartels and is undesirable and unstable when firms compete in oligopolistic markets. This kind of strategic behaviour in a dynamic setting is common in the high-tech and in the pharma industry where firm rely on intellectual property rights to protect their intellectual assets and appropriate returns on their investments.
Research questions
- When does collusion occur in an oligopoly market, and when is it welfare increasing?
- How sensitive are collusive pricing and payoffs to antitrust penalties, the size of the cartel, and the patenting conduct of firms in knowledge based industries?
- How do firms choose between early or late patenting/licensing in different jurisdiction?
Research team
Ted Lindblom, professor, Department of Business Administration
Shubhashis Gangopadhyay, professor India Development Foundation
Stefan Sjögren, associate professor, Department of Business Administration
Taylan Mavruk, professor, Department of Business Administration
Aineas Mallios, dr, Department of Business Administration
Ulf Petrusson, professor, Centre for Intellectual Property